Global Business & Development Law Journal
Volume 4 | Issue 2

Article 3

9-1-1991

Review of the Supreme Court's 1990-01 Term and
Preview of the 1991-92 Term for the Transnational
Practitioner
J. Clark Kelso
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
J. C. Kelso, Review of the Supreme Court's 1990-01 Term and Preview of the 1991-92 Term for the Transnational Practitioner, 4 Pac.
McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev. L.J. 391 (1991).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe/vol4/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Global Business & Development Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
mgibney@pacific.edu.

Articles
Review of the Supreme Court's 1990-91
Term and Preview of the 1991-92 Term
for the Transnational Practitioner
J. Clark Kelso*
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION .............................

392

II. ExEcuTIvE SUMMARY

393
393
393
393

.......................
A. Emotional Injury Under the Warsaw Convention ..
B. Forum Selection Clauses ...................
C. ExtraterritorialApplication of Title VII .........

Ill. REViEW OF THE 1990-91 TERM .................
394
A. Eastern Airlines v. Floyd: No Liability UnderSection 17
of the Warsaw Convention for a Purely Emotional
Injury .................................
394
B. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute: Forum Selection Clause
in a Form Contract for an Ocean Cruise is
Enforceable.............................
397
C. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.: Title VII Does Not
Apply Extraterritoriallyto UnitedStates Employers That
Employ U.S. Citizens Abroad ................
403
IV. PREvIEw OF THE 1991-92 TERM .................
407
A. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan: Extraterritorial
Application of the Endangered Species Act to U.S.
Governmental Operations ..................
407
B. The Confirmation of Justice Clarence Thomas ....
415

*Associate Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific. B.A. 1980,
University of Illinois; I.D. 1983, Columbia University School of Law.

The TransnationalLawyer

Vol. 4

I. INTRODUCTION

Last year, my only prediction was that the Supreme Court
would reverse the decision in Floyd v. EasternAirlines,1 where the
Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff could recover for purely
emotional injury under section 17 of the Warsaw Convention. 2 The
Court obliged by unanimously reversing the Eleventh Circuit
Justice Souter was going through his confirmation hearings
when this article went to press last year, and I noted that he "is
essentially an unknown quantity here in the United States." 4
Because he wrote few opinions during the 1990-91 Term, 5 Justice
Souter's views are still largely unknown.
The end of the 1990-91 Term saw the resignation of Justice
Thurgood Marshall from the Court. President Bush quickly
nominated Judge Clarence Thomas of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia to fill Marshall's seat on the
Court. After lengthy and fractious confimnation hearings before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, Thomas was ultimately confirmed by
the Senate in a close vote. Justice Thomas is the 106th Justice of
the U.S. Supreme Court. Again, as explained below, very little is
known about this Bush nominee to the Court, and it is uncertain
how Justice Thomas will affect the Court's decisions. 6

1. 872 F.2d 1462 (1lth Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991). See infra note 3 and
accompanying text (noting that the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's decision). See also infra Part
IIJ.A. (analyzing the EasternAirlines decision as it pertains to the transnational practitioner).
2. Kelso, Review of the Supreme Court's 1989-90 Term and Preview of the 1990-91 Term
for the TransnationalPractitioner,3 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 393, 424 (1990).
3.
Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991) (Marshall, 1.).
4. Kelso, supra note 2, at 395.
5. Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, 111 S. CL 2749 (1991); Schad v. Arizona, 11 S. Ct.
2491 (1991); Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 111 S. Ct. 2166 (1991); Gollust v.
Mendell, 111 S.Ct. 2173 (1991); Yates v. Evatt, 111 S. CL 1884 (1991); Illinois v. Kentucky, 111
S. Ct. 1877 (1991); Ford v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 850 (1991).
6. See infra Part IV.B. (discussing the confirmation of Justice Thomas).
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II. EXECUTVE SUMMARY
A. Emotional Injury Under the Warsaw Convention
In Eastern Airlines v. Floyd,7 the Court held that there could
be no recovery under the Warsaw Convention for purely emotional
harm. The decision is welcome news to the airline industry, which
otherwise might have been exposed to wide ranging claims of
emotional harm resulting from near misses (which occur with
greater frequency than do accidents resulting in injury or death).
B. Forum Selection Clauses
In Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, the Court upheld a forum
selection clause on the back of a passenger ticket for an ocean
cruise in a suit for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff while
on the cruise. The plaintiff, a Washington resident, will be forced
to litigate her claim, if at all, in the State of Florida, the site
specified by the forum selection clause and the location of Carnival
Cruise Lines' headquarters.
C. ExtraterritorialApplication of Title VII
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) v.
Arabian American Oil Co.,9 the Court held that Title VII, which
proscribes discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color,
religion, gender, or national origin, does not apply to the
employment overseas of a United States citizen by a U.S.
employer. The holding recognizes that the extraterritorial
application of United States law may create special problems of
international comity. Congress can amend Title VII to overrule the
decision, and legislation has already been introduced to accomplish
that result.

7.
8.
9.

111 S. C. 1489 (1991). See infra Part lILA.
111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991). See infra Part I.B.
111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991). See infra Part IILC.
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M.

REviEW OF THE 1990-91 TERM

A. Eastern Airlines v. Floyd: No Liability UnderSection 17 of the
Warsaw Conventionfor a Purely Emotional Injury
The plaintiffs were passengers on an Eastern Airlines flight
from Miami, Florida, to Nassau, Bahamas. After take-off, all three
engines failed, and the crew informed the passengers that they
would be forced to ditch the plane in the Atlantic Ocean. A disaster
was averted when the crew restarted the engines, and the plane
safely landed back in Miami. The plaintiffs filed suit against
Eastern, asserting claims under both the Warsaw Convention and
under state law. Emotional distress was the only damage claimed
in the original complaint.
The district court dismissed all of the emotional distress
claims.10 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court's judgment, and held that a cause of action for purely
emotional injury existed under section 17 of the Warsaw
Convention." The court also held that although the State of2
Florida recognized a cause of action for purely emotional injury,
that cause of action was preempted by the Warsaw Convention."
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the
Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of section 17 of the Warsaw
Convention.14

10. In re Eastern Airlines, Engine Failure, Miami Int'l Airport on May 5, 1983,629 F. Supp.
307, 316 (S.D. Fla. 1986), rev'd Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d 1462 (lth Cir. 1989), rev'd,
Ill S. Ct. 1489 (1991).
11. Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d 1462, 1480 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. CL 1489

(1991).
12. 872 F.2d at 1466-67.
13. l at 1480-83.
14. The questions contained in the petition for a writ of certiorari did not include the
preemption holding. See Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 59 U.S.LW. 3018 (U.S. July 17, 1990) (setting
forth questions for review by the Court). The Court refused to reach the issue of preemption in its
opinion. EasternAirlines, III S. Ct. at 1502.
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The text at issue in Eastern Airlines is from article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention. French is the governing text for the Warsaw
Convention, 5 and article 17 provides as follows in the French
version:
Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu en cas
de mort, de blessure ou'de toute autre lesion corporelle
subie par un voyaguer lorsque l'accident qui a caus6 le
dommage s'est produit i bord de l'aronef ou au cours de
toutes operations d'embarquement et de dibarquement. 16
Roughly translated, the first portion of article 17 says, "The carrier
is responsible for damages sustained in case of death, of wounding
or of all other bodily injuries suffered by a passenger.' 17 The
issue before the Court was whether article 17's limitation to ldsion
corporelle (bodily injuries) excluded recoveries for purely
emotional harm.'"
In Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 9 which arose under the Warsaw
Convention, the Court applied a plain meaning approach to
interpretation of the Warsaw Convention.2" Under the plain
meaning approach, the ordinary meaning of the Convention's text
is to control unless the text is ambiguous.2 ' Justice Scalia, author

15. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985).
16. 111 S. CL at 1493 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Convention Pour L'Unification de
Certaines R6gles Relatives au Transport Arien International, ch. 3, art. 17,49 Stat. 3005 (1934)).
See infra note 17 and accompanying text (translating the text and the Convention's name from French
into English).
17. The American translation, approved by the Senate in 1934, provides that "[t]he carrier
shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any
other bodily injury suffered by a passenger .... - Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Transportation by Air, ch. 3, art. 17, 49 Stat. 3018 (1934).
18. In Eastern Airlines, the plaintiffs did not argue that purely emotional harm constituted
either mort (death) or blessure (wounding). 111 S. Ct. at 1494.
19. 490 U.S. 122 (1989). See generally Note, Chan v. Korean Air Lines, LtL: The United
States Supreme Court "Shoots Down" Notice Requirements Under the Warsaw Convention, 3
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 363 (1990) (authored by Richard M. Clark).
20. Kelso, supra note 2, at 365.
21. Id; Chan, 490 U.S. at 134.
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of the Chan opinion, has in other opinions rather stridently
advocated total reliance solely upon the text of positive law.'
Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Eastern Airlines
suggests that Scalia's views on interpreting conventions,
constitutions, and statutes are not shared by the whole Court. At
the beginning of his analysis, Marshall sets forth a method of
interpretation quite different upon Scalia's view. Instead of the text
being the final word (as Scalia's view would have it), Marshall
indicates that the text is where the Court begins the process of
interpretation.23 Where passages are difficult or ambiguous, the
Court may draw upon other general rules or canons of
construction.24 In addition, the Court "may look beyond the
written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the
practical construction adopted by the parties.""' This formulation
of the Court's process of interpretation is somewhat broader than
Scalia's formulation, and it permits the Court to consider a much
wider set of sources. 6

22. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,452-53 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Green
v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 109 S.Ct. 1981, 1994 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Other authors
have discussed Scalia's approach. See Farber& Frickey, LegislativeIntent andPublic Choice, 74 VA.
L REv. 423, 437 (1988); Comment, The Role of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation:A
New Era After the Resignation of Justice William Brennan?,56 Mo. L. REV. 121 (1991).
23. "'When interpreting a treaty, we begin with the text of the treaty and the context in which
the written words are used." Eastern Airlines, 111 S. Ct. at 1493 (Marshall, J.) (quoting
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988)). Perhaps in a playful
mood, Justice Marshall gave Scalia's Chan opinion an accord citation. Id. Accord is customarily
supposed to signal that the cited case "directly support[s] the proposition." HARvAm LAw REviEw
ASSOCATroN, A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CrrATlON § 2.2, at 8 (14th ed. 1986). Scalia would disagree
that Chan directly supports Marshall's views on the interpretation of treaties. Indeed, in Chan
Marshall joined Brennan's concurring opinion, rejecting Scalia's use of the plain meaning rule. 490
U.S. at 136 (Brennan, J., concurring).
24. 111 S.Ct. at 1493.
25. Id at 1493 (quoting Air Francev. Saks, 470 U.S. at 396).
26. Justice Scalia joined Marshall's opinion for a unanimous Court in Eastern Airlines, but
that does not portend a change in his views. Although Marshall's initial formulation of the Court's
process of interpretation would permit the Court in most cases to look beyond the mere text, the
structure of Marshall's opinion is consistent with Scalia's approach. After concluding that the text
of section 17 would exclude purely emotional loss, Marshall explains that because the term lUsion
corporelle is "'both ambiguous and difficult... we turn to additional aids to construction." Id at
1497. Accordingly, the opinion in Eastern Airlines can be read as consistent with Scalia's view in
Chan that the text governs unless ambiguous.
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The plain meaning of article 17 would seem to exclude
recovery for purely mental harm. The court of appeals recognized
in its opinion that a literal interpretation of the phrase ldsion
corporelle would exclude recovery for purely emotional harm."
The Supreme Court, citing several French dictionaries and the
official translations of the United States and the United Kingdom,
came to the same conclusion.2" The Court concluded that "neither
the Warsaw Convention itself nor any of the applicable French
legal sources demonstrates that '16sion corporelle' should be
translated other than as 'bodily injury'-a narrow meaning
excluding purely mental injuries." 9
Under Scalia's approach, the inquiry would have been at an end
at this point. Marshall continues the analysis, however, by
consulting the negotiating history of the Warsaw Convention and
the conduct and interpretations of the signatories subsequent to the
adoption of the Convention in 1929.0 After reviewing these
materials, the Court concluded that nothing in the negotiating
history or subsequent conduct was inconsistent with a narrow
definition of ldsion corporelle.31
B. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute: Forum Selection Clause in a
Form Contractfor an Ocean Cruise is Enforceable
Responding to Carnival Cruise Lines' [hereinafter Carnival]
attractive commercial advertising, Eulala and Russel Shute,
residents in the State of Washington, contacted their local travel
agent and requested tickets for a seven-day Carnival Cruise from
Los Angeles to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico. Carnival's policy requires
prepayment for tickets, and the Shutes dutifully tendered the
purchase price before receiving the tickets. During a tour of the
ship's galley, Mrs. Shute was injured when she slipped on a deck
mat. The ship was in international waters at the time of the injury.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

872 F.2d at 1471, revd, 111 S. C. 1489.
111 S. Ct. at 1494-95.
Id at 1497.
Id at 1497-1502.
Id at 1497.
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Mrs. Shute filed her suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington. Washington was, after all, the
place where she had heard Carnival's advertisements, the place
where she had purchased her ticket, the place where her doctor
(who would testify at trial) resided, and the place where she lived.
To her chagrin, if not her surprise, 32 the ticket contained a forum
selection clause providing that all suits "shall be litigated, if at all,
33
in and before a Court located in the State of Florida. "
The district court dismissed the complaint on jurisdictional
grounds, finding that Carnival had insufficient contacts to justify
34
the exercise of jurisdiction under Washington's long-arm statute.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that
Carnival's commercial activities directed at Washington State were
constitutionally sufficient to support personal jurisdiction.35
Reaching an issue that was briefed by the parties, but not decided
by the district court,36 the court of appeals also held that the
forum selection clause was invalid under the rule established in The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.37
The Supreme Court reversed, in a 7-2 decision, holding that the
forum selection clause was enforceable under The Bremen." The
Bremen involved the enforceability of a choice of forum clause in
a contract freely negotiated between two sophisticated international
businesses. Zapata, a Texas-based American corporation, entered
into a contract with Unterweser,, a German corporation, to tow a
self-elevating oil drilling rig from Louisiana to the coast of Italy.

32. Butsee infra text accomanying note 50 (Plaintiffs conceded having actual notice of the
forum selection clause).
33. 111 S.CL at 1524.
34. Id
35. The Ninth Circuit first issued an opinion findingjurisdiction under Washington's long-arm
statute and declaring the forum selection clause to be unenforceable. 863 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1988),
wIthdrawn, 872 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1989). After withdrawing its first opinion, the appeals court
certified the personal jurisdiction question to the Washington Supreme Court. 872 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.
1989). The Washington Supreme Court held that personal jurisdiction existed under Washington's
long-ann statute. 113 Wash.2d 763, 783 P.2d 78 (1989). The Ninth Circuit then refiled its original
opinion with appropriate modifications. 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S.CL 1522 (1991).
36. 897 F.2d at 389, rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1522.
37. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
38. Carnival Cruise Lines, 111 S.CL at 1528.
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The contract provided that "[a]ny dispute arising must be treated
before the London Court of Justice." 3 9 Unterweser's towing
operation ran into a severe storm in the Gulf of Mexico, and
Zapata's rig was damaged. Notwithstanding the forum selection
clause, Zapata brought suit against Unterweser in the U.S. District
Court at Tampa, Florida, for negligence and breach of contract."
The Court's opinion in The Bremen adopted the position taken
in section 80 of the Second Restatement of Conflicts of Laws, that
a forum selection clause "will be given effect unless it is unfair or
unreasonable."
In so holding, the Court rejected the
characterization of forum selection clauses by many courts as an
illegitimate attempt to "oust the jurisdiction" of the court.41 In
place of this outdated analysis, the Court recognized the importance
to transnational transactions of agreements between the parties
concerning the most appropriate form of dispute resolution and the
proper location for dispute resolution.4' The Court held in The
Bremen that "in the light of present-day commercial realities and
expanding international trade we conclude that the forum clause
should control absent a . . . clear[] show[ing] that enforcement
would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid
' 43
for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.
The decision in Carnival Cruise Lines, upholding the
enforceability of the forum selection clause, reaffirms the
importance of private agreements regarding dispute resolution.
American courts used to guard their jurisdiction most jealously,
striking down as against public policy agreements to arbitrate,
choice of law clauses and choice of forum clauses.' The Bremen

39.

407 U.S. at 2.

40.

Id, at 3-4.

41. Id. at 9-10.
42. Id. at 12-15.
43. Id. at 15. The enforceability of forum-selection clauses prior to CarnivalCruiseLines has
beenextensively analyzed. See generally Comment,Enforcing Forum-SelectionClauses: The Federal
CourtDilemma andthe ArbitrationClauseAlternative, 1990 . DispuT RESOLUTION 401; Note, The
EnforceabilityofForum-Selection ClausesAfter Stewart Organization,Inc. v. Ricoh Corporation, 6
ALASKA L. REV. 175 (1989); Covey & Morris, The Enforceabilty of Agreements Providingfor
Forum and Choice of Law Selection, 61 DEN. W. 837 (1988).
44. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10 n.10 (citing cases that struck choice of forum, choice of
law, and arbitration clauses).
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was one in a constellation of Supreme Court decisions recognizing
the validity and usefulness of private agreements resolving in
advance many of the preliminary procedural issues that arise in any
45
dispute.
The Court's decision in Carnival Cruise Lines could rather
easily be misread as entirely rejecting judicial scrutiny of forum
selection clauses. After all, if the Court is to enforce a forum
selection clause appearing on the reverse side of a common
carrier's preprinted, nonnegotiable passenger ticket, when that
clause requires a west coast resident to litigate on the east coast,
what sort of forum selection clauses would the Court find
unreasonable?
Fortunately, CarnivalCruise Lines can readily be limited to its
somewhat peculiar litigation history. First, recall that, as mentioned
above, the district court dismissed the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction. As a result of its dismissal on those grounds, the
district court did not reach the validity of the forum selection
clause and made no findings whatsoever with respect to the validity
of that clause. Notwithstanding the absence of any factual record
on the issue, the court of appeals accepted the invitation of the
parties to decide the question, and the court of appeals made its
own factual findings regarding the effect of the clause. 46 The
Supreme Court was not as charitable as the court of appeals,
however, and declared that the absence of fact findings by the
district court left the record essentially empty on the issue of
hardship to the Shutes.47 Counsel in subsequent cases should be
sure to make an appropriate factual record in the district court.

45. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 470 (1989)
(agreement to arbitrate); Volt Information Services v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (agreement to arbitrate and choice of law clause); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (agreement to arbitrate and choice of law
clause); Nat'l Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) (private party may consent to
jurisdiction even in a state where that private party cannot be found by contractually appointing an
agent for receipt of process); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)
(agreement to arbitrate).
46. In particular, the court of appeals found that there was -evidence in the record to indicate
that the Shutes are physically and financially incapable of pursuing this litigation in Florida." 897
F.2d at 389.
47. 111 S. CL at 1527-28.
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Second, counsel for Mrs. Shute essentially conceded that The
Bremen controlled despite the substantial differences between the
facts in The Bremen and the facts in Carnival Cruise Lines.48
Although The Bremen may indeed reflect the Court's analytic
framework for all forum selection clauses, conceding the point
made the Court's opinion in Carnival Cruise Lines much easier to
write. As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, "The Bremen,
which the Court effectively treats as controlling this case, had
nothing to say about stipulations printed on the back of passenger
tickets." 49 Arguably, the decision in CarnivalCruise Lines can be
distinguished on the ground that, in light of respondent's
concession, the Court had no occasion to consider whether The
Bremen should have applied at all.
Third, counsel for Mrs. Shute somewhat off-handedly (one
might even say carelessly) conceded in his brief to the Court that
the Shutes had actual notice of the forum selection clause.5" The
Court accepted this concession and treated the case as though it did
not involve "the question whether respondents had sufficient notice
of the forum clause before entering the contract for passage.'
Because of this concession, the Court could ultimately claim that
the Shutes "retained the option of rejecting the contract with

48. Part H of Respondents' brief to the Court began with the following paragraph: "'The most
prominent case involving forum selection clauses is [The Bremen]. At least in the context of
commercial towing contracts, that case controls the validity of the forum selection clauses. While it
is questionable whether the same policy considerations should govern a contract for cruise ship
passengers, the holding and reasoning of that case applies here to resolve this matter in Respondents
[sic] favor." Brief for the Respondents at 25, Carnival Cruise Lines (No. 89-1647). The Court
properly read this language as a concession that The Bremen governs this case. 111 S. CL at 1526.
49. 111 S. CL at 1531 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. The brief for the Shutes contains the following argument- -Petitioner spends considerable
time in its brief discussing whether the forum selection clause was incorporated in the ticket and that
it was reasonably communicated to the respondents. These are not relevant issues in this case. The

respondents do not contest the incorporation ofthe provisions nor that the forum selection clause was
reasonably communicated to the respondents, as much as tiree pages of fine print can be
communicated. The issue is whether the forum selection clause should be enforced, not whether

Respondents received the ticket." Brief for the Respondents at 26, CarnivalCruise Lines (No. 891647). It is unclear whether counsel really intended this language to concede that the Shutes had
actual knowledge of the forum selection clause. Nevertheless, counsel for Carnival noted the

concession, and the Court agreed.
51.

111 5. C. at 1525.
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impunity," an option that fatally undermined the Shutes' argument
that the forum selection clause was unfairly imposed upon them.52
Because of this litigation history, the case presented to the
Supreme Court was in many respects unusual and incomplete.
Taking the various concessions together, the Court was asked to
declare unenforceable a forum selection clause even though the
buyer had actual notice of the clause and could have refused to
purchase the ticket, the record contained no fact-finding that
enforcement of the clause would create undue hardships upon the
plaintiff, and the plaintiff conceded the application of a case (i.e.,
The Bremen) which involved a commercial transaction between two
sophisticated businesses engaged in transnational transactions. If
this is what Carnival Cruise Lines is all about, then its holding is
quite narrow.
There is, however, language in Carnival Cruise Lines
suggesting that the Court may be serious about its extension of The
Bremen to form contracts presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to
consumers who lack bargaining power. Courts often have treated
such contracts as adhesive in nature and subject to heightened
judicial scrutiny.53 What for other courts has been a vice-the lack
of bargaining over terms in such contracts-is trumpeted by the
Supreme Court as a virtue. According to the Court,
[I]t would be entirely unreasonable for us to assume that
respondents-or any other cruise passenger-would negotiate
with petitioner the terms of a forum-selection clause in an
ordinary commercial cruise ticket. Common sense dictates
that a ticket of this kind will be a form contract the terms
of which are not subject to negotiation, and that an
individual purchasing the ticket will not have bargaining
parity with the cruise line.54
Having disposed of the worry over adhesion contracts, the
Court then proposes three reasons why a forum selection clause is
substantively reasonable. First, a cruise line has a "special interest

52.
53.
54.

402

Id at 1528.
See, e.g., EA. FARNSWORTH, CoCNTRAcrs §§ 4.26, 7.1, 7.11 (2d ed. 1990).
111 S. Ct. at 1527.
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in limiting the fora in which it potentially could be subject to suit"
because passengers could come from virtually anywhere, subjecting
the cruise line to suit from virtually anywhere.55 Second,
enforcing the forum selection clause will reduce confu~ing
litigation over where the suit must be brought. 6 Third, the savings
to the company from being able to litigate only in Florida
will--assuming a competitive market-be passed on to consumers in
the form of lower fares." By appearing to accept at face value
these proffered justifications for a forum selection clause, the Court
has gone a long way towards a federal rule making all forum
selection clauses enforceable.58 If true, the plaintiffs' only remedy
for an inconvenient forum appears to be a motion to transfer
59
venue.

C. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.: Title VII Does Not Apply
Extraterritoriallyto United States Employers That Employ U.S.
Citizens Abroad
Generally, discrimination in employment on the basis of race,
color, religion, gender, or national origin is contrary to title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.0 The extraterritorial application of

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Each of these reasons has a convincing reply. First, if Carnival wants to do business
internationally, it should be ready to defend itself internationally. Moreover, suit in Washington could
not have come as a shock to Carnival since Carnival advertises in Washington and does a substantial
amount of business there. Second, confusion over where suit may be brought could just as easily be
reduced by a rule that makes forum selection clauses in passenger tickets per se unenforceable. Third,
all exculpatory clauses have the effect of reducing the cost to the business and, in a theoretically
competitive market, the price to consumers. That consumer prices may (but probably will not) be
reduced as a result of the Courts holding in CarnivalCruise Lines does not indicate that the rule is
a good one.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1988); Stewart Org. v. Richo Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (holding that
the existence of a forum selection clause was important but not always determinative when
considering a motion to transfer venue). See generally Newman, Forum Selection Clauses in
Commercial Loan Documents: Unimpeachable or Unenforceable?, 107 BANKING LU. 547 (1990).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988). There are several situations in which Title VII does not apply.
For example, Title VII does not apply to employers employing fewer than 15 workers. Id § 2000e(b).
Religious institutions employing individuals of particular religions are also exempt from Title VII.
Id. § 2000e-1.
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Title VII to the employment practices of United States employers
who employ U.S. citizens abroad has long been an unsettled
question. Title VII expressly exempts from its coverage the
employment of non-United States citizens beyond U.S. borders.6
Several lower courts had held, however, that Title VII applied
extraterritorially to the overseas employment of United States
citizens.62 The Court resolved the issue in EEOC v. Arabian
American Oil Co.,63 holding that Title VII did not apply
extraterritorially to the overseas employment of United States
citizens.
The starting point for the Court's analysis was the "longstanding principle of American law 'that legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.' "" There is, in other
words, a presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S.
law. The presumption can be overcome only by a clearly expressed
congressional intent for extraterritorial application.65
The presumption against extraterritorial application, and the
requirement of a clear expression from Congress, serve important
goals. Whenever United States law applies extraterritorially, there
is a risk that it may clash with foreign law.' Courts are ill-suited
to the task of balancing such conflicting interests. Such a
balancing, which obviously involves considerations of foreign
policy, is more appropriately done in the first instance by the
Congress and the Executive Branch. The presumption and the clear
61. Id § 2000e-I ("This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the
employment of aliens outside any State").
62. See, e.g., Bryant v. Int'l Schools Serv., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.NJ. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds,675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982); Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F. Supp. 590 (D. Md.
1986); Love v. Pullman Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423 (D. Colo. 1976), aff'd on other
grounds,569 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1978).
63. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991) (Rehnquist, CJ.).
64. Id. at 1230 (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). See McCulloch
v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963); Benz v. Compania
Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138 (1957); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
65. IIIS.Ct.at 1230.
66. Cf.RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNrTED STATES §
403(2) (1986) (listing factors which may make it unreasonable for one sovereign to attempt to
exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over a foreign national).

404

1991/Review of the Supreme Court's 1990-91 Term
expression rule protect the Judiciary from this sort of policymaking. If Congress is forced clearly to express an intention for
extraterritorial application, it is likely that Congress (or the
Executive) will also explicitly confront the foreign relations impact
of such legislation and build into the legislation such safeguards as
are appropriate.
As already noted, Title VII contains an explicit exemption with
respect to the employment of aliens outside of the United States. 67
The plaintiffs in the case argued that this exemption, which was
limited to the employment of aliens overseas, supported, by
negative implication, a finding of congressional intent to apply
Title VII to the overseas employment of U.S. citizens.' Plaintiffs'
argument was deficient in several respects and was rejected by the
Court.
First, although the negative implication was certainly one
possible interpretation of the alien exemption provision, that
provision had an independent meaning and effect entirely apart
from the negative implication. In particular, the alien exemption
provision had been interpreted by the Court to imply that although
aliens were not protected when employed overseas, they were
protected when employed within the United States.' In light of
the presumption against extraterritorial application and the clear
expression rule, the Court was unwilling to draw the requested
inference.

70

Second, if Title VII were interpreted to protect United States
citizens employed overseas, then Title VII would apply not only to
United States employers that employ U.S. citizens overseas, but
also to foreign employers that employ U.S. citizens overseas.7
This result would occur because Title VII's definition of an
employer does not limit its scope to United States employers.72
67.
68.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l.
111 S. CL at 1233.

69.

Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).

70.
71.
72.

111 S. CL at 1234.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000etb) ("The term 'employer means a person engaged in an industry

affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year").
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This would mean that a French employer, for example, might be
subject to Title VII when employing a United States citizen.73
Such a dramatic extension of U.S. employment law was clearly not
contemplated by Congress and, indeed, would have stretched the
boundaries of Congress' prescriptive jurisdiction.74
Plaintiffs also argued that Title VII's broad jurisdictional
provisions evidenced Congress' intent that Title VII apply
extraterritorially. This was an. especially weak argument because
Title V's jurisdictional provisions employ the same sort of
boilerplate commerce clause language that appears in many federal
statutes. Title VII applies to employers "engaged in an industry
affecting commerce," 5 and " 'commerce' means trade, traffic,
commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among
the several States; or between a State and any place outside thereof
...
,'76The Court's clear expression rule would in effect be a
nullity if this type of broadly-phrased definition of commerce were
sufficient to indicate congressional intent for extraterritorial
application, and the Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument."
The Court's decision appears to be sound. As a matter of
employment law policy, there are good reasons that Title VII
should apply to the overseas employment by United States
companies of U.S. citizens. It is, however, for Congress to make
that extension and not for the courts. Courts extending Title VII to
overseas employment decisions risk creating conflicts between
United States and foreign law and imposing special hardships for
United States companies attempting to do business overseas.
In response to the Court's decision, legislation has been
introduced to extend Title VII to the overseas employment of

73.

111 S.Ct. at 1234.

74.

See RESTATEMENT (TURD) OF THE FOREiGN RELATIONS LAW oF THE UNITED STATES §

75.
76.
77.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
Id. § 2000e(g) (1988); see iUL§ 2000e(h) (defining an industry affecting commerce).
111 S. Ct. at 1231-32.

403.
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United States citizens.7" The legislation would insulate an
employer from liability only when compliance with Title VII
"would cause such employer.., to violate the law of the foreign
country in which such workplace is located." 79 The bill also
clearly excludes from Title VII "the foreign operations of an
employer that is a foreign person not controlled by an American
employee." 8' That this legislation's drafter saw a need to limit
Title Vil's extraterritorial reach supports the Court's clear
expression rule and reluctance to apply U.S. laws overseas in the
absence of such a clear expression.
IV. PREVIEW OF THE 1991-92 TERM
A. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan:8 ' ExtraterritorialApplication
of the Endangered Species Act to U.S. Governmental
Operations
With the enactment of the Endangered Species Act of 1973,2
the United States established itself as a world leader in the fight to
preserve vanishing wildlife. 3 The Act directs the Secretary of the
Interior to create what is commonly known as the Endangered
Species List, 4 and species appearing on that list are accorded
extraordinary protection from harm. 5

78.

American Employees Equity Act of 1991, H.R. 1694, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)

(sponsored by Rep. William J. Jefferson) ("A bill
to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to ensure
that title V11 of such Act applies to the employment of United States citizens by certain employers
in foreign nations.").
79.

Id.

80.

Id.

81.

911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 22,299 (8th Cir. Dec.

10, 1990) (en banc), cert granted, 111 S.Ct. 2008 (1991).
82. Pub. L No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1988)).
83. According to the Court, the Act is "the most comprehensive legislation for the
preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation." Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1533.
85. The Act contains a long list of prohibited conduct regarding endangered species. Id.§
1538. To give merely a taste of the breadth of the Act's proscriptions, it is contrary to the Act "for

any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" to import or export any endangered
species or to "take any such species within the United States or the territorial sea of the United
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Section 7(a) of the Act provides that "[e]ach Federal agency
shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary,
insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such
agency... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any endangered species or threatened species ... ."86 The
Department of the Interior in the Carter Administration enacted a
regulation which required federal agencies to consult with the
Secretary concerning actions in foreign countries.87 The Reagan
Administration changed course, however, and enacted a regulation
which limited the consultation obligation to actions "in the United
States or upon the high seas."" 8 The Defenders of Wildlife,
Friends of Animals and Their Environment, and the Humane
Society of the United States, filed suit against the Secretary of the
Interior, Manuel Lujan, challenging the validity of the regulatory
change as contrary to section 7(a) of the Act.
The Court granted a writ of certiorari to consider two important
questions under the Act: (1) Do the plaintiffs have standing to
challenge the regulations? (2) If the plaintiffs do have standing, is
the regulation consistent with section 7(a) of the Act?89
The standing issue raises difficult questions under both the Act
and Article III of the U.S. Constitution. According to the Supreme
Court in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans Unitedfor
Separation of Church & State," "[a]t an irreducible minimum,
Art. Ill requires the party who invokes the court's authority to [1]
'show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,'
[2] that the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged

States... or upon the high seas." Ma § 1538(a)(1). "'Make' means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." Id. §
1532(19).
86. Id § 1536(a)(2). There are, of course, certain statutory exceptions to the application of this
provision. National security interests, for example, override the obligation created by section 7(a). Id
§ 15360).
87. 50 C.F.R. § 402.04 (1978).
88. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1986).
89. 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs
have standing and that the regulation is inconsistent with the Act. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan,
911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990).
90. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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action,' and [3] 'is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.'
S191 The Secretary argued that the plaintiffs failed to establish that
they personally (or their members personally) had suffered some
actual or threatened injury.'
Attempting fully to describe the law of standing in the few
pages allocated for this article would be like trying to cross the
Pacific Ocean in an eight-foot dinghy. Readers are invited to
consult any of the scores of articles devoted to this topic.93
Resolution of the issue in this case involves two distinct avenues
of approach.
First, the plaintiffs have submitted several affidavits from
members asserting that these members have personally visited
specific sites overseas where U.S. government agency projects may
harm endangered species. 94 Following United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),95 courts
have often accepted this type of affidavit as establishing Article III
standing for environmental groups representing the interests of their
members.

91. M, at 472 (citations omitted).
92. The Secretary did not raise objections on the second or third prongs of the Valley Forge
test. Defenders of Willife, 911 F.2d at 119.
93. See Poisner, EnvironmentalValues andJudicialReviewAfter Lujan: Two Critiquesof the
Separation of Powers Theory of Standing, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 335 (1990); Pierce, The Role of the
Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239 (1989);
Sunstein, Standing and the Privatizationof PublicLaw, 88 COLUM. L.REV. 1432 (1988); Fletcher,
The Structure ofStanding,98 YALE 1,.221 (1988); Perino, JusticeScalia: Standing, Environmental
Law, and the Supreme Court, 15 B.C. ENVTh. Ast. L REV. 135 (1987); Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an EssentialElement of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L REV. 881 (1983);
Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term - Foreword:Public Law Litigationand the Burger Court,
96 HAIV. L.REV. 4 (1982). See generally 13-13A C. WRIoHT, A. M LER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTiCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3531-3531.16 (2d ed. 1984).
94. For example, one "member of Defenders stated in her sworn affidavit that she had visited
Sri Lanka in order to observe its wildlife and animal habitat, and that she intended to return in the
future for the same purpose. She stated that she would be harmed by the Mahaweli project in Sri
Lanka, funded by the federal Agency for International Development (AID), because of its impact on
wildlife ....In her deposition testimony, she also described her wildlife viewing activities in Sri
Lanka, stated that she had visited the Mahaweli project, and expressed her intent to return to that area
to view wildlife." Defendersof Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 120 (quoting Appellees' App. I, at 169-71 (Nos.
89-5192, 89-5386)) (statement by Amy Skilbred).
95. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).

409

The TransnationalLawyer/ Vol. 4
SCRAP is not, however, the Court's most recent pronouncement
96 the Court
in this area. In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,
denied standing to an environmental group when the affidavits on
standing alleged "only that one of respondent's members uses
unspecified portions of an immense tract of territory, on some
portions of which mining activity has occurred or probably will
occur by virtue of the governmental action." ' Lujan arose on a
Rule 56(e) motion for summary judgment under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. The Court distinguished SCRAP because it
arose on a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss.98 Although this
distinction is technically a valid one,99 it suggests the Court is not
firmly committed to SCRAP's broad view of standing."°
The affidavits presented by the plaintiffs are more specific than
the affidavits found insufficient in Lujan. They may not be specific
enough, however, since there apparently are no allegations that any
endangered species are actually affected by the overseas
government projects identified in the affidavits.
The second approach to standing in this case begins with the
citizen standing provision of the Endangered Species Act.
According to section 11 (g) of the Act, "any person may commence
a civil suit on his own behalf - (A) to enjoin any person, including
the United States . .. who is alleged to be in violation of any
provision of this chapter."' 1 The plaintiffs in both Lujan and
SCRAP premised standing upon section 10(a) of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), which provides that "[a] person suffering
legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or

96. 110 S.CL 3177 (1990).
97. Id at 3189.
98. Id
99. On a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, the court is required to draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the nonmoving party. Among other things, this means a presumption "that general
allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." Id Rule 56(e), by
contrast, requires the nonmoving party to submit affidavits or other evidence which "set[s] forth

specificfacts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added).
100. The Court's lack of commitment to SCRAP is clearly apparent in its description of SCRAP
as an "opinion, whose expansive expression of what would suffice for [judicial] review under its
particular facts has never since been emulated by this ourt." Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fedn, 110 S.
Ct. at 3189.
101. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
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aggrieved by agency action . . . is entitled to judicial review
thereof." 1" Comparing these provisions, it is clear that section
11(g) of the Endangered Species Act contemplates a larger class of
possible plaintiffs than does section 10(a) of the APA. Section
11(g) indicates that any person may sue; it does not say that "any
person injured, adversely affected or aggrieved" may sue.
If the Court interprets section 11(g) as broadly as section
11(g)'s words suggest, a difficult constitutional question will be
presented. May Congress constitutionally permit any person to sue
even if that person has not been injured? This issue was not
squarely faced in SCRAP or Lujan, which arose under the APA, or
in Valley Forge Christian College, where the plaintiffs claimed
standing either under the APA or as taxpayers in the absence of a
statute specifically granting taxpayer standing.
How far can Congress go in granting standing? The Court
indicated in Valley Forge Christian College that "[n]either the
Administrative Procedure Act, nor any other congressional
enactment, can lower the threshold requirements of standing under
Art. IIl.",103 This would suggest that section 11(g) of the
Endangered Species Act is unconstitutional. On the other hand,
after rejecting standing under the APA because the plaintiffs had
not demonstrated the loss of any rights, the Court in Valley Forge
indicated that "there is no other basis for arguing that [the APA's]
existence alters the rules of standing otherwise applicable to this
case." ' By this language, the Court appears to have reserved
the question of whether Congress could enact a statute that would
alter the rules of standing applicable to a particular case. Section
11(g) may be just such a statute, creating a special type of
Endangered-Species-Act-injury which all of us suffer when
someone violates the Act.
Even if the Court holds that standing exists-and there remains
a significant risk that the Court will throw out plaintiffs' case based
on the standing issue-the Court will likely rule in the government's

102.
103.
104.

5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
454 U.S. at 487 n.24.

Id.
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favor on the merits. Restating the substantive issue in the case, the
question is whether the Department of Interior's 1983 regulation
excluding from the consultation requirement federal agency actions
taken in foreign countries is consistent with the Act.
Analysis of this issue must begin with a recognition of an
administrative agency's role in the interpretation of the statute
under which it operates. Courts ordinarily defer to an administrative
construction of a statute unless the intent of Congress is clear on
the matter.105 If the intent is not clear, then the question is only
"whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute." 106
The first question then is whether the relevant section of the
Endangered Species Act is clearly intended to have an
extraterritorial effect. The Court will begin its analysis of this
question with a presumption against extraterritorial application of
United States law. As stated in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Co., 0 7 an act will not be given extraterritorial effect unless "the
affirmative intention of the Congress [is] clearly expressed." 108
The relevant section of the Endangered Species Act, section
7(a), provides that
[e]ach Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with
the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency.., is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such
species which is determined by the Secretary, after
consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be
critical, unless such agency has been granted an exemption

105.

Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984),

reh'g denied, 480 U.S. 421 (1984).

106. Id.
107. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
108. Id. at 1230 (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. at 147). See supraParts
.C., MI.C. (discussing EEOC v. ArabianAmerican Oil Co.).
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for such action by the Committee pursuant to subsection (h)
of this section. 19
This section does not contain a clear expression of an intent to
apply extraterritorially. Although the language is no doubt quite
broad ("each federal agency,'" "any action," and "any endangered
species"), such unqualified language is, after the Court's decision
in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil, insufficient to overcome the
presumption against extraterritorial application.
Moreover, other language in section 7 suggests a largely
domestic focus. Section 7(a) refers to consultation "with affected
States," and the exemption procedures in section 7 provide an
explicit role for a representative of an affected state to participate
in the decision of whether to grant an exemption." 0 Section 7
does not, however, provide any role for consultation with a foreign
sovereign which may be adversely affected. The statute's failure to
provide a such a role strongly suggests that section 7 was intended
to apply only domestically. Providing a role for the states
recognizes the interest in federalism and federal-state comity;
international comity would appear to require a similar role for
foreign nations affected by the operation of section 7.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that
section 7(a) does apply extraterritorially, and struck down the
regulation."' The court's analysis is unconvincing, however, in
light of Arabian American Oil. The Eighth Circuit found that the
Act was clearly intended to have an extraterritorial effect by
focusing on (1) the expansive language in section 7(a); (2) the
declaration in section 2 of the Act that "the United States has
pledged itself as a sovereign state in the international community
to conserve to the extent practicable the various species of fish or
wildlife and plants facing extinction;""' (3) the fact that the
Secretary must take into account the actions of foreign
governments in deciding what wildlife to place on the endangered

109.
110.
111.
112.

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
Id. § 1536(e) (identifying members of the Endangered Species Committee).
Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2008.
16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4).
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species list and that many species on the list are found only in
foreign nations; and (4) the International Cooperation section of the
Act which commits the United States to protecting endangered
species through international financial assistance, personnel
assignments, investigations, and by encouraging
foreign nations to
13
develop their own conservation programs.'
Each of these arguments is easily rebutted. First, the seemingly
expansive language in section 7(a) is insufficient as a matter of law
under ArabianAmerican OiL Section 7(a) does not contain a clear
expression of Congress' intent for an extraterritorial application of
its provisions.
Second, the congressional finding that the United States has
pledged itself to the international community to protect endangered
species is nothing more than a recognition that the United States
has entered into a number of treaties and conventions which have
protection of such species as their main object. Indeed, the finding
specifically lists six such treaties. 114 Section 7(a) is not required
by any such international treaty.
Third, the fact that the endangered species list encompasses
species worldwide is not inconsistent with limiting section 7(a) to
domestic government actions. The Act makes it unlawful to import
into the United States any endangered species."' In order to
enforce this section sensibly, the endangered species list must of
necessity have a worldwide scope. The issue is not, however,
whether some sections of the Act apply extraterritorially (which
some obviously do), but whether section 7(a) applies
extraterritorially.
One of the difficulties with section 7(a)'s consultation
requirement is that it may bring the Secretary of the Interior into
conflict with both federal government agencies and with states.
Section 7 explicitly provides for cooperation between federal and
state governments to minimize those conflicts, but contains no
similar provisions to insure cooperation between the United States

113.
114.
115.
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Id § 1537.
Id § 1531(a)(4)(A)-(F).
Id § 1538(a)(1).
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and foreign governments." 6 Congress may rationally have
determined that the section 7 consultation requirement would not
work well in the international context and that other channels of
cooperation (e.g., through bilateral or multilateral treaties) are
better suited for coordinating international efforts.
Fourth, Congress actually addressed the issue of international
cooperation in the Endangered Species Act in the section
immediately following section 7. Section 8 of the Act provides for
financial assistance to foreign countries, encouragement of foreign
programs, the assignment of personnel to foreign countries, and
overseas investigations." 7 The existence of this section dedicated
explicitly to international cooperation undermines the notion that
section 7 is supposed to apply extraterritorially.
The mere existence of these reasonable arguments (and others
that will no doubt be made) are sufficient to raise a doubt as to
whether section 7 should apply extraterritorially. If there is a
reasonable doubt about its extraterritorial application, the Court will
defer to the agency's interpretation of Section 7 limiting its effect
to domestic government actions, and the Court will accordingly
uphold the regulation.""
B. The Confirmation of Justice Clarence Thomas
Justice Thurgood Marshall, appointed in 1967 by President
Lyndon Johnson as the first black to serve on the Supreme Court
of the United States, announced his resignation from the Court after
twenty-four years of service. President Bush quickly nominated
then-Judge Clarence Thomas of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit to fill Marshall's seat. Justice
Thomas is the second black to serve on the Court.

116. 1l § 1S35(b)-(f).
117. 16 U.S.C. § 1537.
118. In light of the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, the Court
might even hold that section 7 is limited to domestic programs and that an agency regulation
purporting to apply section 7 extraterritorially would be beyond the Secretary's authority under the
Act.
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Justice Thomas' confirmation hearings before the Senate
Judiciary Committee did not go particularly well. Before being
appointed to the Court of Appeals in 1989, Justice Thomas was the
chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) during the Reagan Administration. While in that position,
Thomas championed a conservative philosophy based in part upon
a commitment to natural law principles and in part upon a
commitment to individual self-help. Thomas was generally opposed
to affirmative action programs as chairman of the EEOC.
The Senate Judiciary Committee attempted to determine the
extent to which Judge Thomas brought these conservative views
with him to the bench. Over the course of five days of testimony,
Judge Thomas successfully put off the committee by asserting that
positions which he took as chairman of the EEOC were not
necessarily an indication of what he would do as a judge. Thomas
repeatedly emphasized the difference between his policy-making
position at EEOC and position as a judge, which he testified was
largely outside of the realm of policy-making and politics. When
the committee members tried to turn from his past positions to his
present views, Justice Thomas often deflected the questions by
asserting that specific answers to specific questions (such as his
views on abortion) would compromise his ability fairly to sit in
judgment on cases which would come before him as a justice on
the Court.
The final result of the hearings was that neither the committee
nor the public has much information upon which to base a
prediction concerning how Justice Thomas will vote as a member
of the Court.119 Judging from his public statements while at the
EEOC, one would have to guess that Justice Thomas will most
often join Justice Scalia, thereby solidifying the extreme right wing
of the Court. There is of course historical precedent for justices
dramatically changing their views once on the Court (e.g., Justice

119.

The final days of the confirmation process were spent holding a public hearing on

accusations by Professor Anita Hill of the University of Oklahoma School of Law that Thomas had
sexually harassed Professor Hill during the early 1980s when she was Thomas' assistant in the
Department of Education and at the EEOC. Justice Thomas unequivocally denied all of Professor
Hill's allegations, and the full Senate voted to confirm Thomas despite Hill's claim.
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Earl Warren and Justice William Brennan), and only time will tell
whether Justice Thomas will emerge as a strong, independent voice
on the Court.

417

I

